“Disagreeable Rhetoric, Shaming, and the Strategy of Dissenting on the U.S. Supreme Court.” 2019.  Justice System Journal 40: 3-20. 

Why do U.S. Supreme Court justices direct caustic rhetoric against each other in their opinions? In this article, I test two alternative theories for the use of this rhetoric. The coalition maintenance hypothesis maintains that the rhetoric is a shaming mechanism directed against close colleagues to impose costs on dissensus, while the polarization hypothesis suggests that it is a consequence of the rise of affective polarization on the Court. Using an augmented version of the Supreme Court Database, supplemented with Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) data, as well as other original data, I find evidence for both models, with the coalition maintenance hypothesis more prevalent in recent terms. While there is evidence that the justices deploy caustic rhetoric against their ideological opponents, on the Roberts Court the justices have tended to use this rhetoric strategically to shame close colleagues who are voting against coalitional preferences.

Judicial Behavior and Policymaking: An Introduction (Rowman & Littlefield, January 2018)

This introductory textbook explores why judges make the decisions they do, who has the power to influence judicial decision-making, and the consequences of court decisions on policymaking. Further, this book serves to familiarize students with quantitative methods of analyzing data to better understand the field of judicial politics, and how professional political scientists conduct research about the courts. Designed for undergraduates and graduate students alike, this accessible and engaging text provides a thorough introduction to the world of judicial politics. Please feel free to contact me with questions about this textbook or else find out more information here or here.

Ethics and Accountability on the U.S. Supreme Court: An Analysis of Recusal Practices.  Albany, NY: Suny Press (expected Fall 2017)

Ethics and Accountability on the U.S. Supreme Court is an original research monograph that provides a comprehensive examination of the causes and consequences of recusal behavior on the U.S. Supreme Court.  I explore the conditions under which recusals occur, as well as the impact of recusals on case outcomes, the scope of majority opinions, the likelihood of certiorari grants, and public attitudes about the Court.  I trace the evolution of media commentary about recusals, showing how popular discourse about recusals has become politicized and is inflaming demands for reform.  I also provide readers with a rich historical overview of the Court’s recusal practices and describe and evaluate proposals for reforming the process.  My key finding is that the justices do not strictly follow the recusal guidelines set by Congress, but neither do they ignore these guidelines.  Instead, the justices are strategic in their compliance with ethical rules, balancing Congressional guidelines against other institutional and policy goals.

"Deciding Not to Decide: The Politics of Recusals on the U.S. Supreme Court." 2014. Law & Society Review.  48 (3): 621-655.
 When are U.S. Supreme Court justices more likely to recuse themselves from cases?  This article proposes a strategic model of recusal behavior, hypothesizing that the justices balance statutory guidelines concerning recusals against other policy and institutional goals.  Using data from the Supreme Court Database, I find evidence that recusal behavior is influenced by a combination of statutory, policy, and institutional considerations.  Consistent with statutory explanations, which emphasize the elimination of bias or its appearance, justices are more likely to recuse themselves from cases when business interests are before the Court, they have served for shorter terms, and they have previously acted as Solicitor General.  However, I also find that the justices are less likely to recuse themselves when cases are likely to be close or when the justices’ policy goals are likely to be advanced by participating.  These findings suggest that while the justices do follow statutory recusal guidelines, they also have other institutional and policy incentives that lead them to participate in cases despite their conflicts of interest.

Courthouse Democracy and Minority Rights: Same-Sex Marriage in the States. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 2013.

In Courthouse Democracy and Minority Rights: Same-Sex Marriage in the States, Robert J. Hume examines how the democratization of state courts and state constitutional systems has influenced the capacity of judges to protect minority rights. Through an intensive examination of same-sex marriage policy, Hume shows that democratic innovations like judicial elections and initiative amendment procedures have conditioned the impact of judges on state marriage laws. Using a combination of original and publicly available data, Hume demonstrates that "courthouse democracy" has influenced the behavior of state judges, the reactions of the public to state court decisions, and the long-term policy consequences of these decisions, including the passage of state constitutional amendments. Hume concludes that judges will be capable of producing meaningful social change-and protecting minority rights-only when they have the institutional resources that they need to stand against popular opinion.

“State Courts and Policy Legitimation: An Experimental Study of the Ability of State Courts to Change Opinion.” 2012.  Publius: The Journal of Federalism 42(2): 211-233.

Legitimacy theory suggests that judges are uniquely capable of increasing public support for government policies. However, this capacity may not be universal but conditional, depending on the institutional design of courts. In the United States, institutional differences between federal and state courts may make state judiciaries less capable of increasing public support for government policies. I investigate this possibility using an original survey experiment. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three treatments, attributing the legalization of same-sex marriage to a state court, a governor, or a state legislature. I find, generally, that state courts are no more effective than other state institutions at building public support, but that this capacity of courts is variable, depending on levels of judicial independence.

“Comparing Institutional and Policy Explanations for the Adoption of State Constitutional Amendments: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage.”  2011.  American Politics Research 39: 1097-1126. 

The literature on state constitutional amendments remains undeveloped despite recent activity in the area of same-sex marriage policy.  Previous studies have assumed that the adoption of state constitutional amendments is governed by routine policy considerations, but there are strong theoretical reasons for expecting attributes of state institutions also to affect adoption.  In this study, I compare institutional and policy explanations for the enactment of state constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage.  While I expect routine policy considerations to affect the adoption of amendments, I also expect adoption to be influenced by attributes of state institutions, in particular the capacity of state high courts to produce decisions favoring marriage equality.  Using event history analysis, I find that the initial consideration of amendments is driven by policy considerations but that adoption is also guided by institutional considerations, such as the professionalization of state high courts. 

“Strategic Instrument Theory and the Use of Non-Authoritative Sources by Federal Judges: Explaining References to Law Review Articles.” 2010.  Justice System Journal 31: 291-315. 

When do judges include references to non-authoritative sources such as law review articles in their opinions?  Do strategic motivations account for the use of these sources?  This study evaluates strategic explanations for citations to non-authoritative sources by examining the citation of law review articles by judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals.   It is hypothesized that judges are more likely to cite law review articles when they anticipate opposition to their policy choices from other actors who have power to limit or overturn their decisions, such as Supreme Court justices and other judges on the panel.  The study also controls for other potential explanations for citations to law review articles, such as opinion writer ideology, judicial quality, and workload.  The findings provide empirical support for the strategic model of judicial behavior, demonstrating that judges tend to cite more broadly in the face of conflict

"Courting Multiple Audiences: The Strategic Selection of Legal Groundings by Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals." 2009. Justice System Journal 30: 14-33.
This study considers whether judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals select legal groundings based on the expected responses of multiple audiences. It is hypothesized that judges use reasoning-process review when their policies depart from the preferences of higher-court judges and other actors who have the power to overturn their decisions, but use substantive groundings when they wish to broadcast their policies to judges in different circuits. The study uses the Judicial Common Space scores to compare panel ideologies with the preferences of Supreme Court justices, judges in other circuits, judges from the same circuit, and Congress. The results indicate that the choice of legal grounding does vary depending on a panel’s level of agreement with different actors, providing further empirical support for the strategic model of judicial behavior.